Figuring out the optimal time to relieve a starter is probably one of a manager’s toughest in-game decisions. It’s easy for fans to second-guess leaving Adam Wainwright in Saturday and Todd Wellemeyer in last night to give up home runs in the eighth and seventh innings, respectively.

But was it wise to expose these pitchers to possible danger in those situations? La Runcan, of course, looks like a genius if the starters get out of the innings unscathed, not to mention that the bullpen stays fresh. But when those pitchers become overexposed and allow long balls, it could mean the difference between a win and a loss. Let’s dabble in the hypothetical for a moment. If La Runcan had pulled Wainwright and Wellemeyer just before they began facing the opposition lineup for the third time of the game, would their FIGS been better?

In Saturday’s game, Wainwright pitched eight strong innings. The only stain on his record was the home run he yielded to Nick Johnson, which came on Johnson’s fourth at-bat of the game against the Cardinal ace. Last night, Berkman and Lee hit their home runs in their third appearances against Wellemeyer. Granted, both Wainwright and The Colonel were seemingly in grooves, retiring consecutive batters. But unlike Saturday’s tilt, in which Wainwright was working with a three-run lead, the game Monday was tied, so Wellemeyer had less margin for error. And the effect of dominance may have been illusory, or at least enough to lull La Runcan into complacency.

It’s conventionally believed that a pitcher becomes progressively vulnerable as a game wears on and batters see more of his repertoire. To see to what extent this might be true, let’s look at some splits, courtesy of Baseball Reference. The following graph shows major-league pitchers’ effectiveness — which we’ve defined by GPA (Gross Production Average) — vs. batters by the number of times faced in a game (from 2002-2006):

So, it’s hardly earth-shattering, but the fact is that the more times a pitcher faces a batter in a game, the more likely he is to give up runs. To expect that the Cardinals’ staff is somehow impervious to this reality is, well, unrealistic. We understand and appreciate the tension in a manager’s desire to see his starter go as deep in a game as possible and yet not throw the game away. But it seems that, especially with the return of Joel Pineiro — someone who is able to pitch multiple innings at a time — the team can err on the side of conservatism; that is, it has the luxury (if one can even call it that, since it’s more a matter of good strategy) of pulling starters a few batters too early than one batter too late.

So the worry about which pitcher is going to lose his spot in the rotation is quite unnecessary. If we agree that Pineiro, Wellemeyer, Thompson and Looper — and one could include Iron Cap Reyes here — are better than mere one- and two-inning relievers, and yet are not reliable eight- or nine-inning starters, there is room for all of them to pitch regularly (e.g., the Cardinals have their Single-A pitchers “double-start” as a matter of course). If the middling starters are kept within their limits and not exposed beyond facing batters more than twice, the team can optimize its current strength: several pitchers who are capable of pitching four to five quality innings.

This entry was posted by Pip on Tuesday, April 8th, 2008 at 9:04 pm and is filed under analysis. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.