Do you ever wonder how much managers "manage to the stat"? We’re not talking about the decisions that managers make that are *informed* by stats, such as how a particular batter does against a particular pitcher, or whether to bunt in the first inning with the #2 hitter. We mean those times when the stat itself becomes not the means but the ends of a decision, such as whether to leave a struggling starting pitcher in so that he can get the win, or bringing in the closer when a save situation is technically in order.

It’s the latter example that is the topic of today’s graph. When the save became an official stat back in 1969, it obviously wasn’t a major bargaining tool for free agency (indeed, free agency hadn’t even happened). Even so, managers used relievers the way you might expect them to: They’d use their best reliever for the highest-leverage situations, regardless of the save rules. Today, well, it’s a different story: The following graph shows the number of saves that occurred at each number of batters faced. For example, in 1969, there were 104 saves in which the pitcher faced three batters. In 2008, that number had ballooned to more than four times that, at 480.

A few observations:

• Clearly the "start-the-ninth-inning save" (a.k.a., Robb Nen Save) is an example of the stat changing manager behavior/strategy. Dramatically.
• In 2008, there were 20 saves of nine batters or more. In 1969, there were 162!
• 41% of saves in 2008 were three-batter saves. In 1969, three-batter saves were the plurality, but they were only 14% of the total.
• Absent the save rules, we might expect the usage pattern to be more of a gradual arc around that three-batters-faced data point, as it was in 1969.

This entry was posted by Pip on Friday, August 28th, 2009 at 3:00 pm and is filed under by the numbers. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.