In researching data for our upcoming new reliever stat (to replace Saves), we came across some interesting, if not entirely surprising, figures that reveal how relief pitchers have been used over the years. The following chart shows the average number of batters faced per game for relief pitchers since 1954 (data points are at five-year intervals).

As you can see (and probably already knew on an intuitive level), major-league relief pitchers have seen fewer and fewer batters per appearance. The number has fallen quite a bit, down from 8.31 in 1954 to 4.66 in 2009 so far. You can see the steepest decline beginning around 1979, the year Tony “Loogy” La Russa broke in as manager.

For those readers not privy to the conversations that go on in the special region of the worldwide web known as the Twitterverse, we had a rousing discussion with Ben Cook (aka @Skitzzo), among others, about the merits of some newer stats contra some older stats. In particular, we noted that "Whereas once batting avg. was useful (walks weren’t a big part of the game), we now know that OBP trumps it." Boy, did that rattle some cages, not only of Mr. Cook, but several others who chimed in. Cook countered "OBP doesn’t trump BA, it’s simply a different measurement. Are you gonna use OBP w/ RISP? No, you use BA." To which we challenged, "How about this? You get a team of the top 9 players in BA, and I get the top 9 in OBP and we’ll see who wins in a 162-game series."

So, to follow through on our challenge, we’ve run some numbers. With the help of David Pinto’s lineup analysis tool, we were able to determine the maximum number of runs that each of our mythical lineups would generate. We’ll start with the All-Batting-Average team from the NL as of today:

According to the lineup-analysis tool, this team (arranged in an optimal order) would generate 7.020 runs per game (talk about a fantasy team!).

Now for the OBP team. To be sure, many players who hit for a high OBP have a concomitantly high batting average; indeed, three of the players are also on the batting-average team (Pujols, Ramirez, Wright):

This team would generate 7.553 runs per game.

So over the course of a 162-game season, the OBP team would score about 86 more runs, or 8.6 more wins. Thus, in a head-to-head scenario, the OBP team would have an 85-77 record, and the BA a 77-85. We expect that the AL would yield a similar result.

This, of course, is hardly earth-shattering to anyone who has read about the importance of OBP to scoring runs. So why do people still cop to batting average (and other antiquated stats)? Several reasons, probably, but mainly because it’s "the way we’ve always done things" in baseball. It began in 1876 (or earlier) as a reliable measurement of hitting skill because it was a simple way to keep track, and, basically, it was the first of its kind. Plus, walks were a relatively minor component of batting (the NL leader, Ross Barnes, had only 20) and sacrifice flies and hit-by-pitches weren’t tracked. But even as early as 1910, FC Lane was complaining that BA was "worse than worthless" (even we haven’t said something so incendiary!) because it didn’t distinguish between singles and extra-base hits. Thus began an early form of Linear Weights.

Over the years, walks have become a more significant and strategic part of the game (and fielding has become more regular), and observers have stood on the shoulders of pioneers like Lane to continually question and improve upon the game’s statistics. If it’s any comfort to those of us who aren’t afraid of new and sometimes improved ways of looking at the game, the debate is not new. There have always been and probably always will be naysayers. In Lane’s time, according to The Numbers Game, it was writers like William Phelon of the Cincinnati Times-Star, who claimed "The present system [batting average] is about as good as any, and it seems really impossible" to improve. Sounds a lot like the curmudgeonly argument today. We’ll let Mr. Lane’s rebuttal stand for our own: "There are many men who are fond of making an unsupported statement under the apprehension that they have posited an argument … Let’s not make any effort to improve the present system which Mr. Phelon admits is grossly inaccurate. If there is any logic in this contention it escapes our feeble intellect."

• Todd Wellemeyer might’ve missed his start Tuesday, but Mitchell Boggs’s results looked a lot like the Colonel’s average line this season:
  

  Pitcher	BF	IP	BB	SO	H	OBPA
  Wellemeyer (average start)	22	6	2	4	7	.391
  Boggs (8/11)	29	6	4	6	9	.448

• The Reds got away from their game plan to pitch Yadier Molina inside, and it cost them. With the exception of a first-pitch changeup that Molina tried to pull, Molina hit safely when the Reds left pitches out over the plate (curveballs and changeups, at that). In Monday’s game, they jammed him in on the hands with hard stuff.
• What was Jose Oquendo thinking when he sent the lumbering Molina from third base on a shallow fly ball in the fourth inning? Oquendo might’ve done some mental calculus after last night’s game. With one out in the first and Skip Schumaker on third, Matt Holliday hit a fly ball to medium left field. Cinco Cinco scored, but Gomes’s throw was on-line and made the play close. In Tuesday’s game, Schumaker’s fly wasn’t hit as far, and Oquendo has a considerably slower runner in Molina — how much less likely was it that Molina would score? Moreoever, the Cardinals have their 2-3-4 men due up and therefore less reason to gamble. Granted, Gomes isn’t known for his throwing prowess, but you’ve only got 27 outs; don’t waste them needlessly.
• Molina pulled a second boner in the sixth, getting thrown out trying to stretch a single into a double (again by Gomes). According to TLR in his post-game conference, YaMo heard 1B coach McKay yelling "Go, go!" when he actually said "No, no!" Perhaps the manager is covering for his catcher. But if not, isn’t that base-coaching 101? Anyone see the replay to tell whether McKay had his hands up?
• Jason Motte needs to work on his control in Memphis, where he won’t hurt the big club with his walks. He walked two of the six batters he faced Tuesday, one of whom scored the difference-making run. He now has a 1.75 K/BB ratio, which isn’t going to cut it in important middle-relief innings.
• Is "Save a Horse, Ride a Cowboy" really an appropriate song for the ballpark?
• Brendan Ryan was in the game all of three and a half innings, but he packed a lot of excitement in them. Not starting because of a hurt foot, he entered the game in a double switch in the sixth to an applauding crowd and proceeded to knock two singles and convert all plays in the field. But it was his fearless baserunning that entertained most: He stole second in the ninth to remove another double-play possibility with Schumaker, then scored from second on Rasmus’s infield hit-cum-error. If TLR doesn’t appreciate him, perhaps Whitey Herzog would’ve.
• When Dusty Baker brought in LOOGy Danny Herrera to face Schumaker with Ryan on first base and none out, Tony La Russa might’ve pinch hit with Khalil Greene. Schumaker was 0-for-5 against Herrera and, given his propensity to hit ground balls (he’s second in the majors at 60%) — especially, as a lefty, to the second baseman — Schumaker was a dupe for a rally-killing 4-6-3 DP.
• When Rick Ankiel pinch hit with a runner on second in the eighth inning, he was again foiled by a counter move to bring in a LOOGy (against whom he popped out). Ankiel’s chief benefit as a pinch hitter this year has been to get the opposing manager to burn a LOOGy (he has a putrid .166 GPA as a sub). It got us thinking about one difference between this year’s club and those of the glorious early aughts: no switch hitters off the bench. Those earlier Cardinal teams were able to counter LOOGy moves with guys like Scott Spiezio, Abe Nunez, Aaron Miles, Jose Vizcaino and even Roger Cedeno. With Ankiel, who can’t hit lefties, and Khalil Greene, who can’t hit righties, coming off the bench, the Cardinals should look for a switch-hitting pinch hitter. How about Luis Rodriguez, Greg Norton or Tony Clark, for starters?
• The line score said that the Cardinals had 15 hits. They should’ve had two fewer, but home-team-friendly scoring turned a couple of Reds’ errors into safeties. Third baseman Adam Rosales made a bad decision to back up on Matt Holliday’s chopper in the fifth, fielding cleanly but throwing too late to put out the hustling Holliday. Then in the eighth, Molina drilled a liner to right that Chris Dickerson ran down but couldn’t corral. True, Dickerson is lightning-fast, but with regular effort, it’s a single at worst.

Scott Rolen’s presence in town Monday recalled the memory, if apparently water under the bridge, of his and Tony La Russa’s inability to co-exist. But La Russa’s postgame remarks about one of his current players serves as a reminder that Rolen isn’t the only player who chafes the Cardinal manager.

After a game that the Cardinals had won 4-1 and in which now-regular shortstop Brendan Ryan had converted several fine plays (six assists total), the first thing La Russa could muster about his defensive dynamo was that his play made him "feel older than I am."

It may have been said tongue-in-cheek, and, to be sure, TLR had made a passing comment a couple of weeks ago comparing the Flyin’ Irishman with Ozzie Smith. But it’s clear that Ryan’s and La Russa’s styles don’t mesh. Is that enough to keep Ryan from ever fully surfacing?

Ryan broke in with a 1.2 WAR over 67 games in 2007, but the Cardinals (La Russa?) weren’t ready to hand him the fulltime reins and acquired the light-hitting, good-glove Cesar Izturis (read: veteran) to man short for 2008. Still, Ryan made the most of his limited playing time filling in for Izturis (255 innings) and turned in 14.4 UZR/150. Despite Ryan’s reliabilty at the game’s most difficult position, the Caridnals took an ill-advised gamble on Khalil Greene — a.k.a. a veteran — last offseason, and Ryan had to take a back seat again. But with Greene failing to produce in 2009, La Russa was forced, seemingly against his will, to play Ryan (even recently, TLR has given newly acquired veteran and lesser light Julio Lugo some reps at shortstop). This season, Ryan has produced enough with the bat, and his defense is now getting the attention it deserves. With Jack Wilson now plying his trade for the Mariners, Ryan is arguably the best fielding shortstop in the National League. His play is a curious combination that fans and stats equally love. That is, he’s a joy to watch in the field, and he’s actually good.

The problem for him, of course, is that he’s flashy. He plays the position like a basketball point guard who likes to shoot, pushing the ball up the court, slashing and cutting, sometimes making a no-look pass at the baseline and sometimes taking an off-balance three. The problem for La Russa is that he makes those plays, and the stats are bearing it out.

Monday night, Ryan penetrated to his left and right, knocking one ball down before recovering and blasting a missle to first. He later cut off a ball behind the mound with his bare hand, something La Russa is apparently unaccustomed to and uncomfortable with.

With the Cardinals hamstringing themselves for the upcoming winter by obligating themselves to sign Matt Holliday and losing leverage with Albert Pujols (Wallace represented some insurance at first base, in addition to third), the Cardinals won’t have the luxury of taking a $6-million flyer on a veteran shortstop. If La Russa is going to stick around for another year, he’d better start appreciating what he has in Ryan. The team needs Ryan at shortstop in 2010. Will La Russa make him the next Rolen?

Down 7-5, the Cardinals entered the ninth inning of Tuesday’s game with the Mets at Citifield with a thin 7.8% chance of winning. Even faithful fans could have been forgiven for feeling resigned to a loss in view of the win-improbability numbers and the appearance of All-Star reliever Francisco Rodriguez. Yet, to paraphrase Yogi Berra, it wasn’t over ’til it was over. And the most intriguing inning had yet to be played. Following, a batter-by-batter look at the pivotal ninth inning.

Ankiel vs. Rodriguez: Injured Met second baseman Luis Castillo had just left the game, and Rodriguez relieved Johan Santana. It was a wise, if conventional move by Jerry Manuel, given that Santana, though he had pitched well, had thrown 103 pitches and was tiring in the eighth, having yielded a home run to Albert Pujols and a lineout to Matt Holliday. However, with lefty Ankiel leading off and a pinch hitter due up third — likely a lefty, given that two of the Cardinals three usable bench batters were lefties (Ryan, Thurston, Rasmus), Manuel might’ve tried a LOOGy first. Rodriguez falls behind Ankiel 3-1 — not an easy accomplishment, since Ankiel is eighth in the league in chasing out-of-zone pitches. At any rate, K-Rod gives Ankiel a pitch he can hit, and he pulls a grounder up first-base line. Now, nothing against Ankiel here, but the Mets have no excuse for not preventing the double. Not only should the corner infielders be guarding the lines in the ninth inning, first basemen should play on the line for Ankiel no matter what the inning.

Lugo vs. Rodriguez: With Lugo having one hit and three strikeouts in nine plate appearances against him, this was K-Rod’s gimme at-bat. Instead, JuLu pounds him for a +.197 win-probability double into the alley, scoring Ankiel and putting himself in scoring position as the tying run. Keep playing angry, Julio. It’s working.

Rasmus (pinch hitting for Wellemeyer) vs. Rodriguez: The one short-term loser in the Holliday deal, Rasmus continues to rust coming off the pine. He strikes out on a two-seamer out of the zone and failed to move Lugo, the tying run to third with the first out of the inning — a consequential .100 WP-swing.

Schumaker vs. Rodriguez: After grounding out four times against Santana, Schumaker breaks through against K-Rod, who hangs a curveball, driving in Lugo with a line-drive single to tie the game. It would be the second-biggest win-probability play of the game (+.270), behind DeRosa’s 10-inning bases-loaded hit-by-pitch.

DeRosa vs. Rodriguez: Why Rodriguez is still in this game — facing DeRosa, who has a homer and walk in four PAs against him — is anyone’s guess. He’s already thrown 23 pitches and isn’t fooling anyone (his career average pitches per inning is 16.6). Perhaps Manuel just wanted to get the game over with. DeRosa flies out, continuing his frustrating night.

Pujols vs. Rodriguez: Manual is playing with fire letting Rodriguez pitch to Pujols. K-Rod goes 3-0 on Pujols then throws three pitches in the strike zone, each of which Pujols fouls off before Rodriguez backs down and walks him. First and second for Pujols’s statistical doppelganger, Matt Holliday.

Holliday vs. Rodriguez: On a first-pitch changeup, Holliday hits a one-hopper to shortstop Angel Berroa, who had entered the game when Castillo left (the Mets’ starting shortstop, Alex Cora, then moved to second base). But Berroa bobbles it, and all runners are safe.

Ludwick vs. Rodriguez: Rodriguez works Ludwick on the inside, then outside, enticing him to pop out to second. Three out, Mets coming to bat with the game now tied.

Pagan vs. McClellan: Having just been given a new life, what does Tony La Russa do in the bottom of the ninth, given that the game is over if the Mets score just one run? He turns to his second- or third-best reliever available, Kyle McClellan, instead of his best, Ryan Franklin. Moreover, the first two batters — Pagan and Cory Sullivan — were lefties; unless Trever Miller is injured, why not use him here? At least he improves his defense by subbing McClellan in for Ludwick, leaving Rasmus in to play centerfield and bumping Ankiel to right. Pagan runs the count full before grouding out.

Sullivan vs. McClellan: McClellan still can’t locate his curveball, throwing three for balls after mislocating on one to Pagan. He lucks into a lineout to right from Sullivan.

Wright vs. McClellan: Without Gary Sheffield on deck (Berroa took his spot in the order), walking David Wright becomes the best strategy, though McClellan challenges him. He finally gets a curveball to fall, on a 2-0 count. Wright walks.

Angel Berroa vs. McClellan: With two outs and Wright, the Mets’ stolen-base leader on first (23 for 32), McClellan tries three pickoff attempts. Despite baserunners stealing in two of three attempts off McClellan over the last year and a half, Wright probably isn’t running, since he witnessed Yadier Molina throwing out two would-be Met basestealers earlier in the game. Molina does save an advance, blocking a slider in the dirt. Indeed, Wright doesn’t run on any pitches, but makes it to second when Berroa hits an infield single off the end of the bat.

Daniel Murphy vs. McClellan: McClellan busts Murphy in on the hands with hard stuff, setting up a big curveball, which is now his out pitch, in the dirt, and strikes out Murphy on three pitches. The tie is preserved for extra innings and some heroics yet to come.