[For the next few days, we'll be participating in the United Cardinal Bloggers fall roundtable discussion, in which a member blogger poses a question to the group each day. We'll post the responses to our question tomorrow; today's question comes from Mike of Stan Musial's Stance.]

Let’s look at the starting rotation. Currently the Cardinals have 3 names penciled in for 2010: Carpenter, Wainwright, and Lohse. For the last two slots: Do the Cardinals promote from within? Given LaRussa/Duncan’s seeming preference for veteran arms in the rotation, is this a workable plan should they come back for 2010? Who has the best shot of winning a starting slot? Or do the Cardinals sign a veteran arm on the cheap? How much would constitute cheap (years/dollars)? Who should they target?

While Adam Wainwright and Kyle Lohse are generally healthy, Chris Carpenter still represents a lot of risk in the injury department. As such, the Cardinals would be wise to hedge their bets with the rest of the rotation and aim for players without a lot of injury baggage (read: younger pitchers).

Furthermore, it seems doubtful that the team would be able to sign someone with as much upside as any of the pitchers currently in their system. Blake Hawksworth started a majority of his minor-league games, and though his walk and strikeout rates have declined in his last two minor-league seasons, he showed a Pineiro-like propensity for ground balls in his rookie campaign (53.8%). He’ll need to improve on his walk rate and K/BB (1.33) rate, though, and his low HR rate was perhaps misleading due to a below-normal HR/FB rate (5.3%). Ditto Mitchell Boggs, who is in a similar position as Hawksworth and had a similarly unimpressive K/BB rate (1.39).

Jaime Garcia is probably the most talented of the in-system options, but he may need some AAA time to sharpen his arsenal before returning to the bigs. If he doesn’t come north out of camp, he’d be an excellent midseason addition and/or Carpenter fill-in. Another option would be for him to make the team as a midrange reliever.

Assuming Smoltz a) wants to pitch again, b) wants to do so for the Cardinals and c) wants less than his 2009 salary, he — on an incentive-laden deal — would be a fine choice for one of the open slots. Bill James projects him to have a 3.42 ERA, an 8.1 K/9 and a 4.1 K/BB (though in limited action).

Our choice would be Smoltz and Garcia, with Garcia getting action in the pen when not used as the occasional fifth starter. If Smoltz and Carpenter can’t answer the bell and the young guns don’t impress La Runcan enough to stick, the Cardinals may find themselves trading for a pitcher instead of a hitter come July.

[For the next few days, we'll be participating in the United Cardinal Bloggers fall roundtable discussion, in which a member blogger poses a question to the group each day. Our turn to pose a question is next Monday; today's question comes from Nick of Pitchers Hit Eighth.]

If the Cardinals hope to retain their superstar players (and their contracts), particularly extending Albert Pujols, they must achieve cost certainty in other spots on the roster. One way the Cards have tried to achieve that certainty is through a willingness to pay a bit more to young players up front to buy out their arbitration and early free agent seasons (Adam Wainwright, Yadier Molina). If you’re John Mozeliak, who are the next bunch of players you approach with this offer, and when? Is this approach viable long-term as a franchise-building strategy to keep the Cards in play for big contracts despite the relatively limited payroll stance or will it be necessary eventually to constantly churn new prospects through St Louis ?

The answer seems a matter of risk-management and replaceability. And it’s a wise strategy for the team long-term (see JC Bradbury’s excellent explanation of the economics of such deals, the main idea being that individuals are risk-averse, while firms are usually risk-neutral).

The young pitchers simply haven’t proved enough at the major-league level to warrant even a little extra risk on the club’s part. The one pitcher who has some experience, Kyle McClellan, has shown himself to be a $1-2 million/year middle reliever, not exactly the stuff that requires long-term commitment, given replaceability. The other young pitchers who relieved in 2009 — Mitchell Boggs and Blake Hawksworth — are possible starters (like Wainwright after ‘06). But they are a little too green to commit to, and there’s no risk in waiting another year or two with them (again, like Wainwright).

As for non-pitchers, the main guys without long-term deals who figure to be around at least another year are Colby Rasmus, Skip Schumaker, Brendan Ryan and Ryan Ludwick. That’s half the regulars from a 91-win team, representing 8.4 WAR (or the equivalent of Albert Pujols). As the youngest, both in age and ML experience, Rasmus seems the likeliest candidate for a Wainwright-Molina-type deal. But even Wainwright and Molina had played two and three full seasons, respectively, before signing their nearly identical four-year, $15 million contracts. So Rasmus is probably still a year away, too.

Though the Cardinals have some players who could bubble up to the majors at second base soon (e.g., Daniel Descalso and Jarrett Hoffpauir), Schumaker turned in an above-expectations .363 OBP last year and improved with the glove. Though it’s hard to imagine he’ll get any better from where he ended the season, he projects to age somewhat gracefully. If he can put in a couple more seasons like the one Bill James projects for his 2010 campaign — .353 OBP — would deserve a buyout of his two remaining arbitration years, if not his first year of FA. He has certainly earned consideration.

Ryan is the most curious case. He had the fifth-highest WAR (3.2, for a value of $14.3 million) among NL shortstops last year, and yet his manager won’t commit to giving him the job in 2010. The club has seen firsthand over the last several years how difficult it is to find (and keep) good players at the position. Free agents in the next couple of years are either going to cost a lot (Edgar Renteria), not offer much production (Jack Wilson), or both (Orlando Cabrera). The Cardinals’ farm doesn’t offer any near-term fruit, certainly not of Ryan’s quality. Ryan, however, is still another year from his first arbitration eligibility, despite being older than Yadier Molina, and will be 28 next opening day. If he puts together another super season, he should be at the top of the buyout list.

Ludwick is enigmatic, in that he’ll turn 31 next season and we’ve already begun to see his decline (his RC/G numbers the last four years: 5.5, 5.8, 8.2, 5.4). James doesn’t see him tapering off next year, though, and he produced (1.7 WAR/$7.6 million) double his contract in 2009 ($3.7). Buying out his final two years of arbitration (‘10, ‘11) may be worth it, but the fear is that he, with a history of injuries and at his age and position, will decline more rapidly than one might expect. Also, the Cardinals have at least one corner outfielder in the system who could produce in two years. If Ludwick wanted $4.25 million in arbitration coming off a stellar 2008 season, the Cardinals probably don’t have much to lose by going to arbitration this year.

[For the next few days, we'll be participating in the United Cardinal Bloggers fall roundtable discussion, in which a member blogger poses a question to the group each day. Our turn to pose a question is next Monday; today's question comes from Eugene Tierney of Inside Pulse Sports.]

Is it time to let Tony La Russa and Dave Duncan walk?

First, any discussion about the future of LaRuncan should be had in the context of a stat that Nick brought up on PH8 recently: Managers affect wins and losses by only +2.29 to -1.88 over 162 games (from The Hardball Times’s 2008 Baseball Annual). Now, two wins is an important margin, to be sure. But whether managers, and specifically, La Russa, exhibit some repeatable skill to affect wins and losses is debatable.

Second, it’s time for a comprehensive study of whether there is a “Duncan Effect” on pitchers, like the one that JC Bradbury did on Leo Mazzone. Until then, no one knows for certain what kind of an impact (if any) Duncan has on pitchers. Update: JC has actually already done this — he posted a reference on Sabernomics today.

While La Russa has been relunctant to respect young players, to the point of recalcitrancy, the fact is that the 2009 team was his second-youngest in the last eight years. His petulant remarks about Brendan Ryan and others notwithstanding, he relied on young players in 2009 (notably Ryan, Colby Rasmus and Blake Hawksworth). How much he was forced to do so is another question. Another ongoing complaint: Despite his reputation for progressive approaches, TLR has gone stale in recent years, turning away from the useful pitcher-hitting-eighth tactic to a painfully conventional use of his bullpen.

But La Russa doesn’t appear to impede the team’s chances of winning, and although very little can and should be read into the team’s failures in the postseason, one concern came up at the end of the season: The team’s lack of veteran leadership (and that’s putting it kindly). The team hasn’t had a strong clubhouse player-leader since Will Clark’s 51-game swan song in 2000. Does La Russa’s command and control approach preclude such leadership from coming forward, or is it simply a matter of the types of players the Cardinals have had?

Even with those provisos, the strain of thinking that the team shouldn’t upset the status quo makes sense, unless someone like Joe Maddon is available. Maddon’s not, obviously: The bad timing of his contract extension with the Rays and TLR’s relunctance to leave the Cardinals is like something out of When Harry Met Sally. Perhaps one day Maddon and the Cardinals will finally get together. Until then, unless their salary demands are exorbitant — and TLR had one of the highest salaries among managers in 2009 ($4 million+) — LaRuncan should stay, principally out of lack of alternatives.

So you’re wondering if a six-year, bankbusting contract to a thirtysomething Matt Holliday could be worth it. Why not review some recent contract history?

The following graph shows the average salary and value by year for a group of corner outfielders with recent free-agent contracts of four or more years. As it is far from scientific (several caveats apply, not the least of which is the sample size), it is intended to give a rough idea of how contract salaries align with values.

A few observations:

• By Year 3, contracts are at the break-even point.
• Any surplus value in the first three years doesn’t nearly offset the losses in years 4, 5 and 6.
• Possible takeaway: Teams should pay more per year in order to avoid longer contracts.

[For the next 10 days, we'll be participating in the United Cardinal Bloggers Fall roundtable discussion, in which a member blogger poses a question to the group each day. Our turn to pose a question is next Monday; today's question comes from Michael Riehn of Whiteyball.]

How much should the Cardinals spend to sign Matt Holliday? (Please give your answer in total value and average annual value.) What is your Plan B if they don’t resign him? Does the fact that we gave up Brett Wallace+ to add Holliday, or that he qualifies as a type A free agent (First round draft pick plus supplemental pick between first and second round), factor into your decision?

Before we get into contract numbers, here are a few points that shape our thinking:

1. As Nick from Pitchers (used to) Hit Eighth and others have noted, the loss of Brett Wallace et al is a sunk cost, and whether to sign Holliday must be viewed on its own merits. In reality, though, general managers are a lot like politicians, and they can be emotionally invested in a strategy or chain of decisions, and are suspectible to how they are perceived by the public. John Mozeliak hasn’t given any indication of it, and has generally impressed us as the opposite, a calm, dispassionate decision-maker. The most apt analog is his predecessor’s compounding the mistake of trading a top prospect for an accomplished vet, then overpaying that vet to stay. Mozeliak must avoid making the same mistake.

2. The question of whether ownership is committed to winning — a.k.a., the Pujols Contract Extension Demand — has been answered, resoundingly. Most recently, the team mortgaged a good part of its future (not to mention parted with some significant leverage against Pujols in Wallace) to ensure a division championship. More generally, the team wrapped up the decade as the league’s best team. Ownership continues to spend in the top third of baseball on payroll despite being in the bottom third in adjusted market size. Unless Pujols has an unreasonably high burden of "competitive" and therefore isn’t bargaining in good faith, we need to move on from Pujols’s possible rent seeking.

3. As for Plan B, what is the cost of replacing Holliday? That is, what is the club’s outlook for corner outfielders coming up through their system in the next couple of years? Daryl Jones, Allen Craig and Jon Jay are nearing the major-league level. Despite losing the top-line production of Holliday, the team could reap more overall value from one or more of them over a four- to six-year period. And remember: "True shortage of talent almost never occurs at the left end of the defensive spectrum." Add to the value that the team’s current prospects can provide the value of draft picks that the team would receive from a departing Holliday, and the gap closes further.

4. There’s little to no evidence to believe that Holliday provided any significant level of "protection" for Pujols specifically in 2009. Before Holliday arrived on the scene, Pujols had OBP/SLG/GPA numbers of .450/.711/.380. After? .433/.586/.341. In other words, Pujols’s performance actually went down after the Holliday trade.

5. "Ballplayers, as a group, reach their peak value much earlier and decline much more rapidly than people believe." True, that’s as a group. But looking at the decline in value in Holliday’s three most-recent seasons, it’s hard to imagine that he’s going to suddenly slow his decline.

So what’s a fair offer? Using the WAR projection spreadsheet from Beyond the Boxscore and the projections at BaseballProjection (which provides neutral park/league stats), along with some of our own extrapolating, we came up with a rough outline of Holliday’s future value. The numbers may be a bit conservative after his above-expectations 2009 campaign, but our assumption that his defense will remain constant probably offsets that:

Rounding up, Holliday is going to be worth about $90 million over six years ($15/year) and about $80 million over five ($16/year). The Cardinals should offer either of those contracts to Holliday and his agent, Scott Boras, with a gentle but firm message: Take it or leave it. They’ve won with Matt Holliday, and they’ve won without him. They can do so again.