A review of NLCS Game 6 key decisions: Manager scorecard
Game 6 of the National League Championship Series entertained fans for its on-field drama. No less, however, did the inner game played in the dugouts by the respective managers thrill those of us who enjoy second-guessing strategy. With the score so close, did managerial tactics matter? Here’s a review of some of the key decisions made — and not made — by Bruce Bochy and Charlie Manual.
Bottom of the 5th
Score: Tied
Pitching: Madison Bumgarner
Outs: 2
Situation: The Phllies had runners on second and third after Ryan Howard’s two-out double in the gap. Bumgarner faced Jayson Werth, with the switch-hitting Shane Victorino on-deck and first base open.
Decision: Should Bumgarner have intentionally walked Werth to load the bases?
Werth stung lefties with a .402 OBP in 2010, but Victorino was no slouch, either, hitting .381. That meant that the difference between the two batters’ OBPs didn’t exceed the threshold of around .095 to make the IBB worth it for the Giants. They didn’t pay for it, but it technically wasn’t smart.
What actually happened: Bumgarner intentionally walked Werth
Score: -1 Bochy
Bottom of the 6th
Score: Tied
Pitching: Bumgarner
Outs: 0
Situation: Raul Ibanez led off with a double down left-field line, bringing up Carlos Ruiz.
Decision: After Ibanez led off with a double, should Ruiz have sacrificed him to third?
Chooch Ruiz kills lefties with a .431 OBP, so having him give up an out was a bad call. Net WE for swinging away was -3.77, but bunting was -6.15. As it was, it didn’t work for Manual, because his pinch hitter, Ben Francisco, struck out.
What actually happened: Ruiz sacrifice Ibanez to third.
Score: -1 Manual
Top of 7th
Score: Tied
Pitching: Ryan Madson
Outs: 2
Situation: Freddy Sanchez hit a two-out double, bringing up Aubrey Huff, with Buster Posey on-deck.
Decision: After Sanchez doubled, should the Phillies have intentionally walked Huff?
Based on the difference between the two batters’ OBPs vs. RHPs — Huff at .388, Posey at .353 — it was not nearly big enough to warrant the IBB (needed to be at least .090. In the end, it worked out for the Phillies, but it was the wrong move.
What actually happened: Phillies intentionally walked Huff to pitch to Posey.
Score: -1 Manual
Bottom of the 8th
Score: Giants 3, Phillies 2
Pitching: Tim Lincecum
Outs: 1
Situation: The Giants had taken the lead in the top half of the inning, but the Phillies wouldn’t quit as Shane Victorino reached on a one-out single off surprise reliever Tim Lincecum.
Decision: After Victorino singled, should he have tried to steal second?
With Lincecum, notoriously bad at preventing the run with runners stealing against him at a 90% rate, and Victorino himselfwith a 85% success rate in 2010, Manual should’ve given the Flyin’ Hawaiian the green light. He almost surely would’ve made it, putting himself in scoring position. And a single would’ve tied the game.
What actually happened:
Score: -1 Manual
Decision: After Victorino singled, should Raul Ibanez have tried to sacrifice him over?
If Victorino doesn’t steal, another option would have been for Ibanez to sacrifice bunt him to second. But Ibanez is too good a hitter to give up the out, as he showed.
What actually happened:
Score: +1 Manual
Top of the 9th
Score: Giants 3, Phillies 2
Outs: 1
Pitching: Brad Lidge
Situation: With the Giants looking to tack on an insurance run, Andres Torres reached with a drag bunt. Although he appeared to hurt his leg, we’ll assume that all options were still on the table.
Decision: Should Torres have attempted a steal?
Torres stole at a 79% rate in the regular season, while Lidge allowed 95% over the last two years. The potential run-expectancy gain of 0.9 was greater than the potential loss of 0.1, so he should’ve gone for it.
What actually happened: Torres did not run.
Score: -1 Bochy
Decision: Should Freddy Sanchez have tried to sacrifice Torres to second?
If Torres doesn’t steal, Sanchez still might’ve sac bunted him into scoring position. But that would’ve been unwise, as Sanchez’s .327 OBP vs. RHP still meant that the Giants’ win expectancy would decline more for a sac bunt than swinging away. Net WE for sac bunt: -0.76, while swinging away was -0.70, nearly but not quite a wash.
What actually happened: Sanchez swung away and singled.
Score: +1 Bochy
Decision: After two batters reached, should Huff have sacrificed them?
As it was, Sanchez did swing away and reached, giving the Giants runners on first and second with one out. Whereas Sanchez bunting the runner to second would’ve been a bad idea, Huff — even though he had a superior OBP vs. RHP at .353 — should’ve bunted the runners to second and third, which would’ve put twoinsurance runs in scoring position. (Net WE for swinging away — -2.9 — than bunting — -1.70.)
What actually happened: Huff would strike out, and the Giants didn’t get any runs.
Score: -1 Bochy
Decision: After two batters reached, should Phillies have intentionally walked Posey?
This was a fun gamble, since the scheduled on-deck batter was Brian Wilson. It was a fairly simple call for Manual, even though Bochy sent out Pablo Sandoval on-deck as a decoy (Wilson didn’t exactly help sell it by leaving his helmet on in the dugout). Wilson has never had a hit, so the IBB was the clear choice. But if Bochy had truly pinch hit with Sandoval, a .336 OBP hitter vs. RHP this year, it would’ve of course been a bad idea.
What actually happened: The Phillies walked Posey.
Score: +1 Manual
Bottom of the 9th
Score: Giants 3, Phillies 2
Pitching: Brian Wilson
Outs: 1
Situation: The Phillies had one rally left. After Ross Gload grounded out for Lidge, Jimmy Rollins drew a walk.
Decision: As the potential tying run, should Rollins have tried to steal second?
Rollins succeeded 94% of the time in 2010, whereas Wilson and his catchers have allowed only 56% success. Assuming then that Rollins had around a 75% chance of making it, it would’ve been a good call. The likeliness and impact of the positive outcome outweighed the negative.
What actually happened: Rollins didn’t run.
Score: -1 Manual
Decision: After Rollins reached, should Placido Polanco have tried to sacrifice him to second?
It is seldom a good idea to have your team’s no.-2 hitter sacrifice, but would it have benefited the Phillies here? No; with a .346 OBP vs. RHP, Polanco needs to do what he did: swing away. Bunting represented a net WE of -4.77. Swinging away was a net of -3.31.
What actually happened: Polanco grounded into a forceout.
Score: +1 Manual
Final tally
Manual: -1
Bochy: -2
Neither manager distinguished himself, but Manual was slightly less bad than Bochy. Good thing for them, their players are better executors than they are tacticians.