In the weekend series against the Reds, the Cardinals attempted a hit-and-run three times. None succeeded. What happened?

First, let’s review the game situation for each.

Some observations:

• In all three games, the Cardinals either had a lead or were tied.
• In all three games, the attempts were made relatively early in the game.
• In the first two attempts, the Cardinal batter had a platoon advantage.
• In the first two attempts, the odds of succeeding on missed strike were very low (Molina, Berkman running).

For a hit-and-run to succeed, a team has to have either a very good baserunner, a very good contact hitter or preferably both. As noted, the baserunners in the first two attempts were slow; Ryan Theriot, the runner in the third attempt, has a good-enough stolen-base success rate of 74%. So what about the hitters?

The Cardinals, perhaps interestingly, lead the National League in contact rate so far. (They also were tied for best in the league last year.) But the team stats don’t matter for any particular hit-and-run; what matters is the contact rate of the batter. Using career contact rates, here’s how the 2011 team stacks up:

So while the Cardinals didn’t have their speediest guys on the bases, they at least had a couple of their best contact men batting. The platoon advantage is germane here because hitters generally hit better in such situations. Indeed, we can deduce that Molina has an even better contact rate against lefties, because he strikes out less against them: K% of 8.3%, vs. 9.9% against RHP. Same with the left-handed Descalso (20.0% vs. LHP; 18.3% vs. RHP).

Another relevant factor is the count. Depending on the pitcher’s predilection and ability to throw strikes in certain counts, the batter may see a pitch inside the zone. Although for the most part, hitters who make good contact on pitches inside the zone also tend to make good contact on pitches outside the zone, some batters — like Molina and Nick Punto — are better “bad-ball” hitters, relative to their ability to hit balls in the zone. Others — like Pujols and Colby Rasmus — are relatively bad “bad-ball” hitters:

With three-ball counts in the latter two attempts, Molina and Pujols were probably expecting strikes. And they got them: Molina missed a low fastball down the middle, and Pujols waved at a changeup under his hands.

Sometimes the hit-and-run pays off, sometimes it doesn’t. The strategy is occasionally worth it, regardless of the outcome (e.g., hit-and-running with Molina, a notorious double-play candidate). If Tony La Russa is going to employ it, he at least improved his odds with some adept contact hitters last weekend.

This entry was posted by Pip on Tuesday, April 26th, 2011 at 9:55 am and is filed under analysis. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.