After the Cardinals offered $220 million to Albert Pujols and shelled out $38 million for two years of Carlos Beltran and Rafael Furcal, the fact that Kyle McClellan’s relative pittance of $2.5 million stands in the way of the Cardinals upgrading their rotation with Roy Oswalt seems incongruous. Yet, it’s not McClellan but another pitcher who really is preventing the team from acquiring Oswalt.

This post isn’t intended to weigh in on Oswalt (we think he’d be a worthwhile addition) but to retrace how a bad move can have trickle-down effects into the future. And that move was giving Jake Westbrook a two-year contract with a no-trade clause.   First, to be sure, the two-year contract under which Westbrook now toils is far from the worst in history. But it has had an outsized role in creating problems for the team. Let’s review the dominoes:

1. Cardinals trade Ryan Ludwick for Westbrook (July 31, 2010): The trade was widely lambasted at the time (but not by this writer), though from a production standpoint, Westbrook (1.3 WAR) outperformed Ludwick (-0.2). (It’s ironic that the Cardinals wound up with Westbrook back in 2010 after missing out on a doable deal for Oswalt. As we wrote at the time, “If the team wasn’t willing to pay for top talent, it needs to resist the temptation to join the fray after they’ve missed the boat.”) If the Cardinals had left the table at this point, they would’ve come out ahead. Instead, they fell prey to the Gambler’s Conceit.
2. Cardinals sign Westbrook to two-year deal with no-trade clause: Based on a small sample — 75 innings and 317 batters faced — Westbrook delighted the Cardinals into handing him a plum $17.5-million deal with that priceless no-trade power.
3. Cardinals trade Colby Rasmus, et al, for Edwin Jackson, et al (July 27, 2011): In large part because Westbrook wasn’t performing — with an ERA ballooned at 4.86 (511 batters faced) –  the Cardinals felt they had to upgrade their pitching staff (another storyline likely to resurface this season). As a result, they traded an asset in Rasmus for a short-term rental in Jackson. In a bit of irony, Kyle McClellan — the man that the Cardinals are forced to try to trade because of Westbrook’s no-trade clause and a player who performed admirably as a starter when the team needed him — had been pressed into the starting rotation alongside Westbrook — and posted a 4.15 ERA (470 batters) over the same period.
4. Cardinals prevented from acquiring Oswalt on account of inability to divest payroll (today): This ending to this story isn’t completely written yet, but the foreshadowing doesn’t bode well. John Mozeliak may well find someone to take McClellan — he’s a reasonable buy at $2.5 million, after all — but it costs the team a more serviceable pitcher.  McClellan would have essentially been punished for his yeoman’s work as a starter. He’s one of the few versatile arms in the staff, capable of starting and multiple-inning relief stints. And he’s roughly equivalent as Westbrook as a starter, and he’s only a fraction of his salary (not to mention imminently more tradable without the veto power).

So in the course of less than two years, the team’s relationship with Westbrook has led to 1) the trading of a popular if not productive player, 2) the trading of an unpopular yet very talented, cost-controlled player and 3) being a roadblock in the way of adding a helpful component to improve the team for 2012. We have nothing against Westbrook personally or even as a player — the team, however, has done  the equivalent of throwing good money after not-so-good in reaping the results of an ill-advised contract based on a small sample. This is a case in which statistical production, or lack thereof, only begins to explain the full story of an investment gone awry.

Since at least February 2009, Albert Pujols led fans to believe that he wanted to be in St. Louis forever and that the only thing that mattered to him as far as his employer was concerned was being in a position to win. That of course was before he won his second World Series with the Cardinals. But now that Pujols has packed up for California, Sam Miller, writing in the upcoming Feb. 6, 2012 “Recruiting Issue” of ESPN The Magazine, reveals perhaps the true reason why the erstwhile Cardinal first baseman left the team that fulfilled his public goals:

[Angels' GM Jerry] Dipoto did call Dan Lozano, Pujols’ agent, about a week into the free agency period, just to find out what Pujols was looking for — due diligence, he says, but more of an afterthought. The conversation wasn’t about cash. Lozano told the Angels what Pujols wanted: to be on a team that would care deeply for his legacy. Well, shoot, Dipoto thought, we can offer that.

Well, shoot, the team with whom Pujols built his legacy in the first place didn’t care deeply about his legacy? Pujols’s implied obstinence here is patently ridiculous. That is, unless he knew that in St. Louis he had an appreciation for his legacy but had decided to leave anyway. From Dipoto’s telling, it’s as if going to a new team was a fait accompli to Pujols:

As the winter meetings began in Dallas in early December, Dipoto again contacted Lozano. “Danny was very up front about it. Albert wanted to be identified with, and tied to, his new organization and make that part of his legacy,” Dipoto says. “We realized Albert’s desires lined up with us. We wanted to have that kind of marriage. I don’t want to shortchange what Albert does on the field — it’s tremendous — but he does so much more off it.

The Cardinals didn’t officially tender an offer to Pujols until Dec. 6, according to Matthew Leach. So if Pujols was already speaking in terms of his hypothetical “new team,” he very well may have made up his mind without even knowing the Cardinals’ offer. Even after receiving the club’s 10-year, $220-million offer, Pujols — for whom the ESPN report notes that a no-trade clause was important — would’ve had enough material security: it’s hard to imagine that the Cardinals, who have doled out such clauses to Kyle Lohse, Matt Holliday, Carlos Beltran, Lance Berkman and Jake Westbrook like they were candy, would’ve balked at one for Pujols.

The more that Miller relates the tale of Pujols’s recruitment from the Angels’ point of view — and it’s a shame that he doesn’t include anything from the Cardinals’ perspective — it appears that Pujols was a needy and injured ego willing to respond to the cooing of a economiastic suitor. Miller goes on:

Moreno, Dipoto, Lozano, and Albert and Deidre Pujols set up a conference call Tuesday night. Money wasn’t mentioned. Rather, Moreno charmed Pujols by stressing the familial nature of the his club: the longest-tenured manager in the game, a stable roster of coaches, a homegrown core that included the recently extended Weaver.

…

“I only spend five minutes talking to or meeting a guy and I know pretty much,” Pujols said after he signed. “God has given me that wisdom. I don’t even know [Moreno], and he called me one of his partners. That means a lot.”

We’re happy that Pujols feels that he has been blessed with God’s wisdom. The Bible’s book of Proverbs, which contain much wisdom, warns against the flattery of what one might consider “newfound partners”: “Faithful are the wounds of a friend;profuse are the kisses of an enemy.” And given what we now know about Lozano, Pujols may be deceiving himself. In this another bit of wisdom is apt: “Whoever trusts in his own mind is a fool.”

Pujols needs, like all of us, to continue seeking wisdom. The more we read about what appear to have been his true motivations and their contrast with his public testimony sadly taints what was an otherwise productive and spectacular statistical legacy in St. Louis. As noteworthy as that legacy was, it unfortunately doesn’t go much beyond that.

Seldom does anything that the Detroit Tigers do impact the St. Louis Cardinals (unless it’s fielding in the World Series). But the Tigers’ signing of Prince Fielder is welcome news for a couple of reasons: First, it validates their decision not to over-overpay for Albert Pujols. And second, it means that Fielder won’t be blasting circuit clouts for the team’s division rivals.

If Keith Law’s #1 free agent — ahead of Pujols — inked an overvalued contract that is no better than Albert Pujols’s — similar average annual value but one fewer year — then it stands to reason that the Cardinals did well not to succumb to the pressure to sign their former first baseman. Given that Dave Cameron of Fangraphs and other keen minds are giving the Fielder deal mixed reviews, one can only assume that by extension, Pujols’s deal is similarly or more inflated. Granted, in his prime at 27, Fielder produced value comparable to Pujols at age 31 (5.5 WAR to 5.1), Pujols is at minimum already 32 years old and his career already in its second year of decline, Fielder is only 27. Fielder will be more than halfway through his new contract by the time he reaches the age that Pujols signed with the Angels.

Cameron reasons that the Tigers, because of their being on the cusp of greatness, place a higher value on a win, and therefore are more understandably willing to pay a bit of a premium for Fielder’s services. The Cardinals were in a similar position to pay above the going rate (~$4-5 million per win) because of their projected win total as well as because of the unique marketing value that Pujols offered. But not that much: If the Tigers overpaid, then how much more so did the Angels? And the same would’ve been true of the Cardinals, who were apparently willing to pay upwards of $220 million.

Not only does the Fielder signing validate the Cardinals’ “losing out on” Pujols, it also of course improves their own chance of winning the division in 2012. Fielder was almost certainly already not returning to the Brewers, but he theoretically could’ve landed in Chicago. So now neither division rival has the fearsome slugger, nor any other National League team that might be contending with the Cardinals for one of the two (sigh) wild-card spots. The Cubs and Brewers are weaker without the league’s most productive hitter, so the Cardinals improve relative to them without making a single move.

In an odd, perhaps unexpected way, Fielder leaving the division also makes more possible the chance of Marc Rzepczynski entering the rotation at some point this season. True, Fielder is but one lefthanded hitter for whom Scrabble is reserved as a LOOGy. But if Mike Matheny eschews conventional wisdom that says he needs two LOOGys in the pen, Rzepczynski could be freed to start.

In an offseason heretofore filled with news of the team’s best player departing and of the signings of supporting cast members, the Cardinals’ signing of Carlos Beltran to a two-year, $26 million deal is a welcome headline.

For being ranked as ESPN’s seventh-best free agent this winter, Beltran gets a relatively short contract. The length probably is reflected in — that is, compensated for — in the average annual value, which at first seems a bit high for a player with significant injury risk. But the Cardinals have few holes that they need to fill, and therefore could afford to go big, especially given the lack of alternatives to Beltran. David DeJesus, Michael Cuddyer, Jason Kubel and Josh Willingham, all inferior players, had already signed, thus leaving the Cardinals to consider low-impact options like Coco Crisp Andruw Jones and Cody Ross. With Tony La Russa gone, JD Drew might’ve been conceivable, but TLR likely already poisoned that well. Thus, Beltran, who was always the best of the bunch, was a natural choice to spend money on.

With Pujols having forced the Cardinals to stretch their evaluation of a dollar, John Mozeliak perhaps has a different value of money. After all, when you get outbid trying to buy a million-dollar home, that $400,000 model looks pretty affordable. Heck, you don’t even mind paying full price, either. But Beltran figures to pay off, even considering his injury risk. The Cardinals’ approach here may actually be similar to that of Theo Epstein when he was with the Red Sox and signed Drew: He reasoned that, when healthy, Drew was an impact player (read: hit for a very high OBP), and when he wasn’t healthy, Epstein could make do with somewhat productive players. The alternative is to have a full season of mediocrity, so the choice should be clear. Beltran represents rate stats over counting stats, and we like the acquisition.

Speaking of OBP, though Beltran will likely slot in as the team’s no.-2 hitter, he makes good sense at leadoff, though as we mentioned last week, we doubt seriously that rookie manager Mike Matheny would be so bold. He’s more position-limited than most people — including Mozeliak, apparently — consider him as (he really should be playing only right field next year), but that still leaves Allen Craig, when he returns, as an option at other locations around the diamond.

John Mozeliak notes that the Cardinals “still think we have some holes.” One is right field, and Carlos Beltran would fill it well.

Despite currently polling at Fungoes as the Cardinals’ #1 late-season public enemy, Beltran certainly makes sense. For the position, the Cardinals presently have only the newly re-signed Skip Schumaker (who, we should note, said as his contract was announced all of the things that former teammate Albert Pujols should’ve said if he had signed with his team). Moreover, the team lacks much in the way of top-of-the-order on-base skills.

Even playing only 142 games last year, Beltran gained 4.7 WAR. Fangraphs’ fans project him to be worth at least three wins next year, and that’s estimated at a mere 124 games (that’s more than Jon Jay earned in just about as many plate appearances). He would not be an option to play centerfield, given that he’s only slightly better than Lance Berkman in right field. But he would indeed be the answer to what to do in Allen Craig’s absence (between one and two months) and may afford another second-base experiment by Craig when he returns.

As Eric Seidman at Fangraphs notes, “Beltran was the fourth most productive non-pitcher on the market” with 4.7 WAR last year. To put it into perspective, Albert Pujols had 5.1. Seidman goes on to say:

Beltran will end up signing for something like one year and $12 million, or two years and $20 million, both of which could include playing time incentives. This is well below what 4-5 WAR often costs on the market, but a low enough salary that teams aren’t scared off by his injury history.

With Pujols gone, one is tempted to simply act like the Cardinals have an endless treasure chest of money to hand out. They obviously do have around $22 million otherwise unused, but a few free agent signings can add up quickly, so they will still need to spend wisely. Even so, Beltran falls into that category.

Given Beltran’s high on-base percentage (.385 in 2011, .368 projected for 2012), he would be an ideal #2 hitter or even leadoff man, though Mike Matheny strikes us as too conventional to deploy a resource like Beltran like that.