This post isn’t intended to weigh in on Oswalt (we think he’d be a worthwhile addition) but to retrace how a bad move can have trickle-down effects into the future. And that move was giving Jake Westbrook a two-year contract with a no-trade clause.   First, to be sure, the two-year contract under which Westbrook now toils is far from the worst in history. But it has had an outsized role in creating problems for the team. Let’s review the dominoes:

1. Cardinals trade Ryan Ludwick for Westbrook (July 31, 2010): The trade was widely lambasted at the time (but not by this writer), though from a production standpoint, Westbrook (1.3 WAR) outperformed Ludwick (-0.2). (It’s ironic that the Cardinals wound up with Westbrook back in 2010 after missing out on a doable deal for Oswalt. As we wrote at the time, “If the team wasn’t willing to pay for top talent, it needs to resist the temptation to join the fray after they’ve missed the boat.”) If the Cardinals had left the table at this point, they would’ve come out ahead. Instead, they fell prey to the Gambler’s Conceit.
2. Cardinals sign Westbrook to two-year deal with no-trade clause: Based on a small sample — 75 innings and 317 batters faced — Westbrook delighted the Cardinals into handing him a plum $17.5-million deal with that priceless no-trade power.
3. Cardinals trade Colby Rasmus, et al, for Edwin Jackson, et al (July 27, 2011): In large part because Westbrook wasn’t performing — with an ERA ballooned at 4.86 (511 batters faced) –  the Cardinals felt they had to upgrade their pitching staff (another storyline likely to resurface this season). As a result, they traded an asset in Rasmus for a short-term rental in Jackson. In a bit of irony, Kyle McClellan — the man that the Cardinals are forced to try to trade because of Westbrook’s no-trade clause and a player who performed admirably as a starter when the team needed him — had been pressed into the starting rotation alongside Westbrook — and posted a 4.15 ERA (470 batters) over the same period.
4. Cardinals prevented from acquiring Oswalt on account of inability to divest payroll (today): This ending to this story isn’t completely written yet, but the foreshadowing doesn’t bode well. John Mozeliak may well find someone to take McClellan — he’s a reasonable buy at $2.5 million, after all — but it costs the team a more serviceable pitcher.  McClellan would have essentially been punished for his yeoman’s work as a starter. He’s one of the few versatile arms in the staff, capable of starting and multiple-inning relief stints. And he’s roughly equivalent as Westbrook as a starter, and he’s only a fraction of his salary (not to mention imminently more tradable without the veto power).

So in the course of less than two years, the team’s relationship with Westbrook has led to 1) the trading of a popular if not productive player, 2) the trading of an unpopular yet very talented, cost-controlled player and 3) being a roadblock in the way of adding a helpful component to improve the team for 2012. We have nothing against Westbrook personally or even as a player — the team, however, has done  the equivalent of throwing good money after not-so-good in reaping the results of an ill-advised contract based on a small sample. This is a case in which statistical production, or lack thereof, only begins to explain the full story of an investment gone awry.

[Angels' GM Jerry] Dipoto did call Dan Lozano, Pujols’ agent, about a week into the free agency period, just to find out what Pujols was looking for — due diligence, he says, but more of an afterthought. The conversation wasn’t about cash. Lozano told the Angels what Pujols wanted: to be on a team that would care deeply for his legacy. Well, shoot, Dipoto thought, we can offer that.

Well, shoot, the team with whom Pujols built his legacy in the first place didn’t care deeply about his legacy? Pujols’s implied obstinence here is patently ridiculous. That is, unless he knew that in St. Louis he had an appreciation for his legacy but had decided to leave anyway. From Dipoto’s telling, it’s as if going to a new team was a fait accompli to Pujols:

As the winter meetings began in Dallas in early December, Dipoto again contacted Lozano. “Danny was very up front about it. Albert wanted to be identified with, and tied to, his new organization and make that part of his legacy,” Dipoto says. “We realized Albert’s desires lined up with us. We wanted to have that kind of marriage. I don’t want to shortchange what Albert does on the field — it’s tremendous — but he does so much more off it.

The Cardinals didn’t officially tender an offer to Pujols until Dec. 6, according to Matthew Leach. So if Pujols was already speaking in terms of his hypothetical “new team,” he very well may have made up his mind without even knowing the Cardinals’ offer. Even after receiving the club’s 10-year, $220-million offer, Pujols — for whom the ESPN report notes that a no-trade clause was important — would’ve had enough material security: it’s hard to imagine that the Cardinals, who have doled out such clauses to Kyle Lohse, Matt Holliday, Carlos Beltran, Lance Berkman and Jake Westbrook like they were candy, would’ve balked at one for Pujols.

The more that Miller relates the tale of Pujols’s recruitment from the Angels’ point of view — and it’s a shame that he doesn’t include anything from the Cardinals’ perspective — it appears that Pujols was a needy and injured ego willing to respond to the cooing of a economiastic suitor. Miller goes on:

Moreno, Dipoto, Lozano, and Albert and Deidre Pujols set up a conference call Tuesday night. Money wasn’t mentioned. Rather, Moreno charmed Pujols by stressing the familial nature of the his club: the longest-tenured manager in the game, a stable roster of coaches, a homegrown core that included the recently extended Weaver.

…

“I only spend five minutes talking to or meeting a guy and I know pretty much,” Pujols said after he signed. “God has given me that wisdom. I don’t even know [Moreno], and he called me one of his partners. That means a lot.”

We’re happy that Pujols feels that he has been blessed with God’s wisdom. The Bible’s book of Proverbs, which contain much wisdom, warns against the flattery of what one might consider “newfound partners”: “Faithful are the wounds of a friend;profuse are the kisses of an enemy.” And given what we now know about Lozano, Pujols may be deceiving himself. In this another bit of wisdom is apt: “Whoever trusts in his own mind is a fool.”

Pujols needs, like all of us, to continue seeking wisdom. The more we read about what appear to have been his true motivations and their contrast with his public testimony sadly taints what was an otherwise productive and spectacular statistical legacy in St. Louis. As noteworthy as that legacy was, it unfortunately doesn’t go much beyond that.

If Keith Law’s #1 free agent — ahead of Pujols — inked an overvalued contract that is no better than Albert Pujols’s — similar average annual value but one fewer year — then it stands to reason that the Cardinals did well not to succumb to the pressure to sign their former first baseman. Given that Dave Cameron of Fangraphs and other keen minds are giving the Fielder deal mixed reviews, one can only assume that by extension, Pujols’s deal is similarly or more inflated. Granted, in his prime at 27, Fielder produced value comparable to Pujols at age 31 (5.5 WAR to 5.1), Pujols is at minimum already 32 years old and his career already in its second year of decline, Fielder is only 27. Fielder will be more than halfway through his new contract by the time he reaches the age that Pujols signed with the Angels.

Cameron reasons that the Tigers, because of their being on the cusp of greatness, place a higher value on a win, and therefore are more understandably willing to pay a bit of a premium for Fielder’s services. The Cardinals were in a similar position to pay above the going rate (~$4-5 million per win) because of their projected win total as well as because of the unique marketing value that Pujols offered. But not that much: If the Tigers overpaid, then how much more so did the Angels? And the same would’ve been true of the Cardinals, who were apparently willing to pay upwards of $220 million.

Not only does the Fielder signing validate the Cardinals’ “losing out on” Pujols, it also of course improves their own chance of winning the division in 2012. Fielder was almost certainly already not returning to the Brewers, but he theoretically could’ve landed in Chicago. So now neither division rival has the fearsome slugger, nor any other National League team that might be contending with the Cardinals for one of the two (sigh) wild-card spots. The Cubs and Brewers are weaker without the league’s most productive hitter, so the Cardinals improve relative to them without making a single move.

In an odd, perhaps unexpected way, Fielder leaving the division also makes more possible the chance of Marc Rzepczynski entering the rotation at some point this season. True, Fielder is but one lefthanded hitter for whom Scrabble is reserved as a LOOGy. But if Mike Matheny eschews conventional wisdom that says he needs two LOOGys in the pen, Rzepczynski could be freed to start.

In an offseason heretofore filled with news of the team’s best player departing and of the signings of supporting cast members, the Cardinals’ signing of Carlos Beltran to a two-year, $26 million deal is a welcome headline.

For being ranked as ESPN’s seventh-best free agent this winter, Beltran gets a relatively short contract. The length probably is reflected in — that is, compensated for — in the average annual value, which at first seems a bit high for a player with significant injury risk. But the Cardinals have few holes that they need to fill, and therefore could afford to go big, especially given the lack of alternatives to Beltran. David DeJesus, Michael Cuddyer, Jason Kubel and Josh Willingham, all inferior players, had already signed, thus leaving the Cardinals to consider low-impact options like Coco Crisp Andruw Jones and Cody Ross. With Tony La Russa gone, JD Drew might’ve been conceivable, but TLR likely already poisoned that well. Thus, Beltran, who was always the best of the bunch, was a natural choice to spend money on.

With Pujols having forced the Cardinals to stretch their evaluation of a dollar, John Mozeliak perhaps has a different value of money. After all, when you get outbid trying to buy a million-dollar home, that $400,000 model looks pretty affordable. Heck, you don’t even mind paying full price, either. But Beltran figures to pay off, even considering his injury risk. The Cardinals’ approach here may actually be similar to that of Theo Epstein when he was with the Red Sox and signed Drew: He reasoned that, when healthy, Drew was an impact player (read: hit for a very high OBP), and when he wasn’t healthy, Epstein could make do with somewhat productive players. The alternative is to have a full season of mediocrity, so the choice should be clear. Beltran represents rate stats over counting stats, and we like the acquisition.

Speaking of OBP, though Beltran will likely slot in as the team’s no.-2 hitter, he makes good sense at leadoff, though as we mentioned last week, we doubt seriously that rookie manager Mike Matheny would be so bold. He’s more position-limited than most people — including Mozeliak, apparently — consider him as (he really should be playing only right field next year), but that still leaves Allen Craig, when he returns, as an option at other locations around the diamond.

Despite currently polling at Fungoes as the Cardinals’ #1 late-season public enemy, Beltran certainly makes sense. For the position, the Cardinals presently have only the newly re-signed Skip Schumaker (who, we should note, said as his contract was announced all of the things that former teammate Albert Pujols should’ve said if he had signed with his team). Moreover, the team lacks much in the way of top-of-the-order on-base skills.

Even playing only 142 games last year, Beltran gained 4.7 WAR. Fangraphs’ fans project him to be worth at least three wins next year, and that’s estimated at a mere 124 games (that’s more than Jon Jay earned in just about as many plate appearances). He would not be an option to play centerfield, given that he’s only slightly better than Lance Berkman in right field. But he would indeed be the answer to what to do in Allen Craig’s absence (between one and two months) and may afford another second-base experiment by Craig when he returns.

As Eric Seidman at Fangraphs notes, “Beltran was the fourth most productive non-pitcher on the market” with 4.7 WAR last year. To put it into perspective, Albert Pujols had 5.1. Seidman goes on to say:

Beltran will end up signing for something like one year and $12 million, or two years and $20 million, both of which could include playing time incentives. This is well below what 4-5 WAR often costs on the market, but a low enough salary that teams aren’t scared off by his injury history.

With Pujols gone, one is tempted to simply act like the Cardinals have an endless treasure chest of money to hand out. They obviously do have around $22 million otherwise unused, but a few free agent signings can add up quickly, so they will still need to spend wisely. Even so, Beltran falls into that category.

Given Beltran’s high on-base percentage (.385 in 2011, .368 projected for 2012), he would be an ideal #2 hitter or even leadoff man, though Mike Matheny strikes us as too conventional to deploy a resource like Beltran like that.

Make no mistake: Verlander had a monster year in 2011, finishing fourth among the AL’s pitchers in FIP, second in xFIP and second in WAR. Among all junior-circuit players, he ranked seventh in WAR:

In short, he had a super season. But the bottom line is this:

• He wasn’t the best player in his league
• He was arguably not even the best pitcher in his league

Roll back the clock then to 1968, when Gibson likewise took both the Cy Young and the MVP (and a Gold Glove, to boot). Gibson led not only the NL but all of baseball in FIP. Among all NL players, he by far led in WAR (Baseball-Reference.com version):

In fairness, this is a bit of an apples-and-oranges comparison, since Baseball Reference calculates WAR differently from Fangraphs, our default source for WAR (including the 2011 AL numbers above). And because B-Ref uses ERA rather than FIP, Gibson gets a boost, since his minuscule ERA in 1968 — 1.12 — was even better than his FIP — 1.77 (B-Ref uses actual runs allowed to calculate WAR, rather than fielding-independent runs). But adjusting for Gibson’s FIP still leaves him above 10 WAR (by our calculations), clearly above the other pitchers, as well as Hank Aaron, who led NL hitters with 7.9 WAR in 1968. If you’re still not swayed, consider that Gibson had an outsized impact on the game, facing 1161 batters, whereas Aaron batted “only” 676 times. Verlander didn’t have nearly that disparity, facing 969 batters while Ellsbury took 732 plate appearances.

We’ll grudgingly concede the Cy Young to Verlander (though we opted for Sabathia based on his fielding-independent performance). But the MVP should be reserved for the league’s best player overall, not merely a superlative pitcher whose team reaches the playoffs. Of Verlander and Gibson, that applies only to the latter.

And that brings us to our question:  What does Mike Matheny have to accomplish with this team in 2012 – with or without Pujols – to be considered “successful” in his rookie season?

Another 90 win season? Make the playoffs? Make the NLCS? Just contend? Win the World Series again? Just keep the team upright and drama-free? Etc. Make sure to include the reasoning behind your answer, perhaps even including a comparison between your expectations of Matheny…and what he needs to accomplish to be considered successful in 2012 (is there a difference?).

It’s possible to set expectations regardless of the personnel Matheny has. Actually, we would argue that roster-independent analysis is the only fair way to assess him. Success for Matheny means showing an ability to optimize his personnel (whoever they are), from lineup setting (no low-OBP leadoff men, please) to the rotation to minor-league callups. It also means consistently wise strategy, giving his team the best chance to win, whether it’s the running game or using his best relievers in the highest-leverage situations, regardless of “Save” conditions. It will be vital for Matheny to show restraint and not overreact when proven approaches appear to fail, even for long stretches (e.g., not putting on more hit and runs when the team is hitting into double plays). For someone with no managing experience, having patience with the long season and concepts like regression may be the most difficult. One unique challenge for Matheny will be helping the team adjust from a command-and-control environment to something conceivably less so. Clubhouse control will look different — perhaps a more self-policing approach — so Matheny will need to shepherd that change, most likely by relying on the team’s veterans, who have a somewhat checkered record of leadership (see the Game 2 walkout).

Those criteria to us are more an indicator of a manager’s success than wins and losses, which are mostly dependent on players, and certainly not playoff success, which of course is a crapshoot.

No. The problem for the Cardinals may not be whether they pay more than 9/$200 million, but whether they have to. Given the scarcity of teams who both need a first baseman and can afford Pujols, the Cardinals will have only slightly more competition than they faced last winter, when they had sole negotiating rights. And John Mozeliak has a bit of a history here, handing Kyle Lohse a four-year deal before he hit the market and outbidding — who, we’re not sure — for Matt Holliday. So the relevant question is: Would they need to pay him more than 9/200? Though we expect at least a couple of other teams (e.g., Rangers and Angels) to bid, we doubt they would approach that mark.

As far as the bargain of his past contract goes, this is a non-starter. Both parties voluntarily entered into the agreement back in 2004, each believing that the deal was fair. Pujols, for all he knew, could’ve blown his elbow that spring and never played another game, and the Cardinals wouldn’t have asked for their $100 million back. Neither should Pujols “ask” for it back as he negotiates the next deal.

Ray gives some well-considered reasons why the idea of paying him “whatever it takes” isn’t helpful. And as Tom already intimated, we’re already beyond reasonable with a nine-year deal, when a seven-year deal starting in an age-32 season is even pushing it. To put it into perspective, Miguel Cabrera got “only” eight when he was 25. Even Barry Zito’s contact — regarded as one of the worst all-time — is only seven years and $126 million and even that was signed when he was 29.

Yes, baseball is a business, but that doesn’t mean that the owners are the only businessmen. Players are not serfs with limited rights (anymore) but highly compensated professionals in their own regard. Ownership has a downward force on salaries, but players exert an similar force upward, so the idea that “baseball is a business” should only be understood in neutral terms (other than the fact that the sport being a business has enabled us to witness the best baseball on earth). Albert Pujols has as much chance (or as some seem to believe of the organization, an obligation) to act “with his heart” as the management does. To hear Pujols tell it — “It’s not about the money. I already got my money. It’s about winning and that’s it.” — the World Series title (and two in the last six years) is all he needs.

[Today's United Cardinal Bloggers roundtable question is from Christine Coleman of Aaron Miles' Fastball on behalf of her blogging co-conspirators, Miranda and Tara.]

The first two questions have looked ahead but Miranda, Tara and I are not quite ready to forget what the Cardinals have accomplished in 2011 only days after the World Series ended – and not just October, but the race to get there. We know the September surge and October playoff run were definitely team efforts. But, just like there’s an MVP for the NLCS and World Series, we want to know your opinion of who made the biggest contribution during that entire turnaround.

Our question: who is your most valuable Cardinal from Aug. 25 on?

As much as Chris Carpenter rallied the club with his indomitable spirit, Lance Berkman provided an unflappable, calm performance in leading the team after Aug. 25 with a .446 OBP. More contextually, though, he led with an incredible 1.879 WPA (Pujols had 1.332; Carp 0.396) — his hits mattered most. Big Puma’s Game-6 plate appearance epitomized what he brings to the club, both tangible — he knocked “only” a single, but it (.468 WPA) was worth more than all three of Pujols’s Game-3 home runs combined — and intangible — he approached the at-bat with the insouciance of a spring-training appearance and yet, as F. Scott Fitzgerald put it, “with the single-mindedness of a burglar blowing a safe.”

Which brings us to our second point. Unlike in years past, when Tony La Russa’s high-performing teams tensed up in the absence of an easygoing veteran presence  (as helpful as they are, one imagines that it’s difficult to relax around La Russa and Pujols), the 2011 Cardinals came back to win because they played with a free and easy spirit. We credit Berkman in large part for that.

The Cardinals declined to exercise the 2012 options on contracts for shortstop Rafael Furcal and reliever Octavio Dotel, allowing each veteran to reach free agency but not closing the door entirely to the club’s interest in their return.

The team wasn’t going to touch Furcal’s $12-million option, so buying him out for $1.3 million was the easy and smart choice. He may have had a miserable .240 BABIP this season, whereas his expected BABIP might’ve been more like .304, but even so he doesn’t hold much promise to return to his days as an offensive sparkplug. And his defense (-9.4 UZR/15o) wasn’t much better than Ryan Theriot’s (-14.8). Furcal rates as a Type-B free agent, so offering arbitration may make sense for the Cardinals.

The Dotel cut was less straightforward. It’s probably a matter of having maximum payroll available for the Pujols auction, but given Dotel’s $750,000 buyout, the difference between his option of $3.5 million was only $2.75 million; it’s an even bet that the team will pay at least that for a righty reliever this winter. (Remember that the Cardinals paid Ryan Franklin $3.5 million in 2011 for half a season of service.) Dotel demonstrated with his 3.23 FIP that he can still be productive and worth a a few million — he had a free-agent value of $3.8 million in 2011. The clincher, though, was that Dotel comes out as a Type-A free agent, which would net the Cardinals two first-round draft picks if they offer arbitration and he declines.

By cutting ties with Dotel and Corey Patterson, they officially made a two-month rental of half the players they received in the Rasmus trade.