The BBWAA selected Detroit pitcher Justin Verlander as the American League Most-Valuable Player. The last Cardinal pitcher to be voted MVP, of course, was Bob Gibson in 1968. But Justin Verlander is no Bob Gibson.

Make no mistake: Verlander had a monster year in 2011, finishing fourth among the AL’s pitchers in FIP, second in xFIP and second in WAR. Among all junior-circuit players, he ranked seventh in WAR:

In short, he had a super season. But the bottom line is this:

• He wasn’t the best player in his league
• He was arguably not even the best pitcher in his league

Roll back the clock then to 1968, when Gibson likewise took both the Cy Young and the MVP (and a Gold Glove, to boot). Gibson led not only the NL but all of baseball in FIP. Among all NL players, he by far led in WAR (Baseball-Reference.com version):

In fairness, this is a bit of an apples-and-oranges comparison, since Baseball Reference calculates WAR differently from Fangraphs, our default source for WAR (including the 2011 AL numbers above). And because B-Ref uses ERA rather than FIP, Gibson gets a boost, since his minuscule ERA in 1968 — 1.12 — was even better than his FIP — 1.77 (B-Ref uses actual runs allowed to calculate WAR, rather than fielding-independent runs). But adjusting for Gibson’s FIP still leaves him above 10 WAR (by our calculations), clearly above the other pitchers, as well as Hank Aaron, who led NL hitters with 7.9 WAR in 1968. If you’re still not swayed, consider that Gibson had an outsized impact on the game, facing 1161 batters, whereas Aaron batted “only” 676 times. Verlander didn’t have nearly that disparity, facing 969 batters while Ellsbury took 732 plate appearances.

We’ll grudgingly concede the Cy Young to Verlander (though we opted for Sabathia based on his fielding-independent performance). But the MVP should be reserved for the league’s best player overall, not merely a superlative pitcher whose team reaches the playoffs. Of Verlander and Gibson, that applies only to the latter.

[Today's United Cardinal Bloggers roundtable question comes from Deckacards at Cards 'N Stuff.]

And that brings us to our question:  What does Mike Matheny have to accomplish with this team in 2012 – with or without Pujols – to be considered “successful” in his rookie season?

Another 90 win season? Make the playoffs? Make the NLCS? Just contend? Win the World Series again? Just keep the team upright and drama-free? Etc. Make sure to include the reasoning behind your answer, perhaps even including a comparison between your expectations of Matheny…and what he needs to accomplish to be considered successful in 2012 (is there a difference?).

It’s possible to set expectations regardless of the personnel Matheny has. Actually, we would argue that roster-independent analysis is the only fair way to assess him. Success for Matheny means showing an ability to optimize his personnel (whoever they are), from lineup setting (no low-OBP leadoff men, please) to the rotation to minor-league callups. It also means consistently wise strategy, giving his team the best chance to win, whether it’s the running game or using his best relievers in the highest-leverage situations, regardless of “Save” conditions. It will be vital for Matheny to show restraint and not overreact when proven approaches appear to fail, even for long stretches (e.g., not putting on more hit and runs when the team is hitting into double plays). For someone with no managing experience, having patience with the long season and concepts like regression may be the most difficult. One unique challenge for Matheny will be helping the team adjust from a command-and-control environment to something conceivably less so. Clubhouse control will look different — perhaps a more self-policing approach — so Matheny will need to shepherd that change, most likely by relying on the team’s veterans, who have a somewhat checkered record of leadership (see the Game 2 walkout).

Those criteria to us are more an indicator of a manager’s success than wins and losses, which are mostly dependent on players, and certainly not playoff success, which of course is a crapshoot.

[Today's United Cardinal Bloggers roundtable question comes from El Maquino, appropriately about El Maquino himself, Albert Pujols.]

No. The problem for the Cardinals may not be whether they pay more than 9/$200 million, but whether they have to. Given the scarcity of teams who both need a first baseman and can afford Pujols, the Cardinals will have only slightly more competition than they faced last winter, when they had sole negotiating rights. And John Mozeliak has a bit of a history here, handing Kyle Lohse a four-year deal before he hit the market and outbidding — who, we’re not sure — for Matt Holliday. So the relevant question is: Would they need to pay him more than 9/200? Though we expect at least a couple of other teams (e.g., Rangers and Angels) to bid, we doubt they would approach that mark.

As far as the bargain of his past contract goes, this is a non-starter. Both parties voluntarily entered into the agreement back in 2004, each believing that the deal was fair. Pujols, for all he knew, could’ve blown his elbow that spring and never played another game, and the Cardinals wouldn’t have asked for their $100 million back. Neither should Pujols “ask” for it back as he negotiates the next deal.

Ray gives some well-considered reasons why the idea of paying him “whatever it takes” isn’t helpful. And as Tom already intimated, we’re already beyond reasonable with a nine-year deal, when a seven-year deal starting in an age-32 season is even pushing it. To put it into perspective, Miguel Cabrera got “only” eight when he was 25. Even Barry Zito’s contact — regarded as one of the worst all-time — is only seven years and $126 million and even that was signed when he was 29.

Yes, baseball is a business, but that doesn’t mean that the owners are the only businessmen. Players are not serfs with limited rights (anymore) but highly compensated professionals in their own regard. Ownership has a downward force on salaries, but players exert an similar force upward, so the idea that “baseball is a business” should only be understood in neutral terms (other than the fact that the sport being a business has enabled us to witness the best baseball on earth). Albert Pujols has as much chance (or as some seem to believe of the organization, an obligation) to act “with his heart” as the management does. To hear Pujols tell it — “It’s not about the money. I already got my money. It’s about winning and that’s it.” — the World Series title (and two in the last six years) is all he needs.

[Today's United Cardinal Bloggers roundtable question is from Christine Coleman of Aaron Miles' Fastball on behalf of her blogging co-conspirators, Miranda and Tara.]

The first two questions have looked ahead but Miranda, Tara and I are not quite ready to forget what the Cardinals have accomplished in 2011 only days after the World Series ended – and not just October, but the race to get there. We know the September surge and October playoff run were definitely team efforts. But, just like there’s an MVP for the NLCS and World Series, we want to know your opinion of who made the biggest contribution during that entire turnaround.

Our question: who is your most valuable Cardinal from Aug. 25 on?

As much as Chris Carpenter rallied the club with his indomitable spirit, Lance Berkman provided an unflappable, calm performance in leading the team after Aug. 25 with a .446 OBP. More contextually, though, he led with an incredible 1.879 WPA (Pujols had 1.332; Carp 0.396) — his hits mattered most. Big Puma’s Game-6 plate appearance epitomized what he brings to the club, both tangible — he knocked “only” a single, but it (.468 WPA) was worth more than all three of Pujols’s Game-3 home runs combined — and intangible — he approached the at-bat with the insouciance of a spring-training appearance and yet, as F. Scott Fitzgerald put it, “with the single-mindedness of a burglar blowing a safe.”

Which brings us to our second point. Unlike in years past, when Tony La Russa’s high-performing teams tensed up in the absence of an easygoing veteran presence  (as helpful as they are, one imagines that it’s difficult to relax around La Russa and Pujols), the 2011 Cardinals came back to win because they played with a free and easy spirit. We credit Berkman in large part for that.

The Post’s Derrick Goold and Joe Strauss reported the Cardinals’ first act of business of the offseason:

The Cardinals declined to exercise the 2012 options on contracts for shortstop Rafael Furcal and reliever Octavio Dotel, allowing each veteran to reach free agency but not closing the door entirely to the club’s interest in their return.

The team wasn’t going to touch Furcal’s $12-million option, so buying him out for $1.3 million was the easy and smart choice. He may have had a miserable .240 BABIP this season, whereas his expected BABIP might’ve been more like .304, but even so he doesn’t hold much promise to return to his days as an offensive sparkplug. And his defense (-9.4 UZR/15o) wasn’t much better than Ryan Theriot’s (-14.8). Furcal rates as a Type-B free agent, so offering arbitration may make sense for the Cardinals.

The Dotel cut was less straightforward. It’s probably a matter of having maximum payroll available for the Pujols auction, but given Dotel’s $750,000 buyout, the difference between his option of $3.5 million was only $2.75 million; it’s an even bet that the team will pay at least that for a righty reliever this winter. (Remember that the Cardinals paid Ryan Franklin $3.5 million in 2011 for half a season of service.) Dotel demonstrated with his 3.23 FIP that he can still be productive and worth a a few million — he had a free-agent value of $3.8 million in 2011. The clincher, though, was that Dotel comes out as a Type-A free agent, which would net the Cardinals two first-round draft picks if they offer arbitration and he declines.

By cutting ties with Dotel and Corey Patterson, they officially made a two-month rental of half the players they received in the Rasmus trade.