Sunday in Houston, the Cardinals may have completed the now joyless task that Albert Pujols unwittingly began in the 2005 National League Championship Series: that of ending Brad Lidge’s career as a closer, at least for the Astros. In particular, Eckstein, Rolen, and Molina (the three greatest offensive contributors to the World Series) touched Lidge for three hits and five runs batted in. The next day, manager Phil Garner demoted him from the closer’s role, yet again.

Lidge’s tragic fall has been just one component in the demise of the greatest pitching staff in the division in recent years. Other components include the Stros’ failure to retain Andy Pettitte; Roger Clemens’ increasingly limited role; the decision to fire pitching coach Jim Hickey; and the loss of bullpen ringleader, Russ Springer.

Yet over the last couple of days in Pittsburgh, the Cardinals have suggested that they may have played an even greater role in the Lidge tragedy than people had realized. For there they made their recent habit of roughing up closers difficult to ignore. For two days in a row, they took control of the game with the Pirates’ new, yet proven, ninth-inning specialist on the mound. Last year, Salomon Torres outpitched every other reliever in the division in terms of WPA, with last year’s Pittsburgh closer Mike Gonzalez not far behind. So the heroics of Spiezio and Duncan against Torres are considerably more impressive than taking a save from, say, the 2006 versions of Derrick Turnbow or Ryan Dempster (last year’s big losers in terms of WPA among relievers league-wide). Indeed, the recent accomplishments of Spiezio and Duncan look more like So Taguchi’s unexpected bullying of Billy Wagner in the last NLCS.

To be clear, I am not prophesying the end for either Torres or Wagner, frightening closers both.

I am recognizing, however, the LaRussa Cardinals’ unique and intriguing position in regard to closers. This position has something to do with LaRussa’s dictum, “Play a hard nine,” which implicitly aims at the opponent’s closer. For it promises that, even if the Cards are trailing at the end of a game and the other guys’ closer emerges from the bullpen, the good guys will keep at it.

Yet it may mean something more for LaRussa to demand a hard ninth inning from his lineup than it does for other managers to do the same. For he and Dave Duncan effectively invented the modern closer, who specializes in protecting leads in the ninth, in the person of Dennis Eckersley. It’s almost as if LaRussa and Duncan omnipotently raise up and tear down closers; or like they suckered their opponents into investing in a new type of pitcher whose single weakness only they knew how to exploit. Mwah ha ha ha.

Before the game on Opening Night, Joe Strauss published in the Post Dispatch an interesting admission by Atlanta Braves general manager John Schuerholz. Asked to name the game’s “current power teams,” Schuerholz listed the Yankees, his own Braves, and the Cardinals. Referring to St. Louis, he said, “No question, they’ve developed into an elite franchise.”

Even readers who do not scoff at the remark may take it with a grain of salt. After all, this is the GM of a team that lost 83 games last year admitting a team that won just 83 into his own “elite” club.

Yet, of course, Schuerholz chose the words “elite franchise” in order to refer beyond last year’s rosters. He could have been suggesting, accurately enough, that over the last seven years the Cardinals have dominated their division nearly as completely as the Braves had controlled theirs for fourteen; that, in those spans of time, St. Louis has won as many world championships as Atlanta; or that, of all active managers, only Tony LaRussa has won more games than Bobby Cox. At the very least, he was acknowledging that, of all National League teams this millenium, only the Cards have accrued more actual and pythagorean wins than the Braves—as our own Pip has demonstrated nicely.

Over the long haul, in other words, the Cardinals have turned into the sort of team that the Braves have been, at least until last season: one that stays on top of the standings, keeps showing up in October, and, if only because it makes more chances for itself, occasionally wins it all.

If such consistent success isn’t the goal of a baseball team, then the goal necessarily becomes unsustainable success, and the Cards and Braves can start envying the Marlins and Mariners, or even the Cubs or the Mets.

If the Mets don’t envy the Braves, that’s a recent development. For they have had a long time to look up at the likes of Atlanta and their cross-town rivals, punctuated by pretty inconsistent success. To put this more positively, the Mets’ recent accomplishment is most impressive in the context of the Braves’ 14-year stranglehold on the NL East: New York disrupted, and may have ended, Atlanta’s dynasty.

Likewise, if a division rival overtakes the Cardinals this year, it will have not only beaten an 83-win team that somehow backed into a world championship. It will have bested the National League’s best team so far this millenium.

If such an NL Central team emerges this year, however, it is quite unlikely that it will proceed to take this distinction from the Cardinals, or to match the Cards’ success over the long haul.

With two of last year’s late-inning specialists auditioning for the rotation; a closer and a newly-acquired reliever on the mend; and autumn phenom Josh Kinney headed to season-ending surgery; this may be a sporting occasion to recognize the task that faces the Cardinals bullpen.

Last season Wainwright and Looper carried the bullpen, at least in terms of win probability added (1.70 and 0.55, respectively) and innings pitched (75 and 73.1). (Josh Hancock actually pitched 77 innings, but his WPA was only 0.11). Although Kinney pitched just 25 innings, he contributed a welcome 0.47 WPA. Without these three top performers, last year’s pen surely would have suffered, and this year’s model may cause more than a little concern—especially since the new Cards rotation does not project to pitch as many innings as have its recent incarnations.

Yet this year’s relief corps will surely improve where last year’s actually suffered the most: in the closer’s role. While Jason Isringhausen was blowing an uncharacteristic number of saves (10) and compiling a pen-worst –0.82WPA, management was slowly coming to terms with his injury. Having recognized the problem, the team could not possibly allow post-op Izzy to repeat the tragic performance, even if he does not return to form.

The spring roster has provided plenty of worthy candidates for the 2007 pen. Yet they will have some big shoes to fill. We might put their task in context by sizing up the opposition.

The division’s traditionally best pitching team, down in Space City, may also have to hand the ball to its relievers a little earlier in games than it did last year, given that it’s replaced Andy Pettitte with Woody Williams, whose starts are unlikely to last quite as long as the two-time Yankee’s. Dan Wheeler outpitched Wainwright last year; and both Chad Qualls and Trever Miller bested Looper. Yet they may have to keep covering for Brad Lidge, who lacks Izzy’s medical excuse for his disastrous 2006. Perhaps for the first time in years, Cards fans have little reason to covet the pitching staff of their worthiest division rivals.

Believe it or not, Pittsburgh fielded the division’s top two relievers in terms of WPA (Salomon Torres contributed 2.63 and Mike Gonzalez 2.26, exceeding even Freddy Sanchez’ and Jason Bay’s WPAs) and the second best bullpen overall (Astros: 2.95; Pirates: 2.57). But the rest of the team counteracted that contribution. And they’re without Gonzalez this year.

The Cardinals pen put together the Central’s only other positive season, judging by total WPA (1.24). The Cubs’ relievers amounted to –1.51; the Reds’ –2.07; and the Brewers’ –4.92. Derrick Turnbow deserves the blame for Milwaukee’s distinction. And, by improving their rotation and adding Francisco Cordero, the Brewers have restricted the damage that he can do. Cincinnati is depending on the healthy return of both Eddie Guardado and Gary Majewski, and will need lots of bullpen help.

Again, the Cubs present an interesting case. The bear whelps hope that Ryan Dempster will rebound from his horrible 2006 (-3.40WPA) although, as with Lidge, they don’t know exactly what the problem was. And they hope that Neal Cotts can replace David Aardsma (despite the difference between their 2006 WPAs of –0.56 and 0.95, respectively). Yet their best chance to improve the home relievers’ bench in Wrigley could come from Kerry Wood, who decided to make the switch from starting last season and showed up at camp thin and determined. The team press explains that his two spring innings thus far have actually been quite good (nevermind the 18.00ERA). He would have escaped with zero earned runs had only Henry Blanco (the team’s best defensive catcher) caught the wild third strike for the final out, before the next batter hit a grand slam.

From a Cardinals perspective, moments like these may define the spring: the time when the big-market rivals’ reign over the offseason finally comes to an end, and they have to start playing games, and watching things go wrong. Play ball!

In recent years, our own Central Division has produced at least a couple of elite starting rotations. In 2003, as the previously strong rotations led by Matt Morris and Roy Oswalt faltered, the Cubs starters came into their own. More specifically, Mark Prior and Carlos Zambrano hit their strides, nearly doubling their previous season’s numbers of innings pitched; dramatically decreasing their ERAs; and adding a great deal to their team’s win probability. Kerry Wood improved on his strong 2002. And Matt Clement contributed plenty. Despite the deleterious effects of one Shawn Estes, these starters led a rotation with a collective 11.04 WPA.

The Cubs took care of their fifth starter problem by adding Greg Maddux in 2004. And they again fielded the division’s best collection of starters in terms of WPA (9.19). But they weren’t much better than the Cards’ new rotation of Chris Carpenter, Matt Morris, Woody Williams, Jeff Suppan, and Jason Marquis (who put together a 8.39 WPA with very little help). And since these birds had run support from the legendary MV3, the Cubs’ elite rotation had already given Chicago all it could.

In 2005, the Cards replaced Woody with Mark Mulder and saw their starters’ collective WPA rise to 11.66. But that year Roger Clemens, Andy Pettitte, and Roy Oswalt pushed the Astros’ starters’ WPA up to 15.30, despite getting no positive contribution from their colleagues. Although their teammates could not provide the run support to keep up with the Cards’ second consecutive 100-win roster, the Astros starters did prod their team past the Cards in the postseason to become the second Central team in a row to get swept in the World Series.

The 2006 Astros starters could not maintain such elite performance with Clemens sitting out the first few months of the season and Pettitte throwing the kind of innings that get a man to thinking about retirement. Their collective WPA dropped to 5.67, near their respectable 2004 level of 5.72. Yet even this diminished rotation outperformed the rest of the division, which saw miserable total starter WPAs of 0.71 (Cards), 0.46 (Brewers), 0.24 (Reds), -2.43 (Pirates), and –5.74 (Cubs).

Relying on Woody Williams to replace Pettitte and facing at least several months without Clemens, the Astros rotation can hardly expect to regain its 2005 production. Can one of their competitors overtake the division’s traditional bastion of elite starters?

The Brewers may have the best chance. Their ace Ben Sheets should return healthy and, according to CHONE, as the division’s best starter (according to ZiPs too, if Clemens does not sign with Houston). To be sure, though, those projections do not expect him to put up the sort of numbers that Prior earned in 2003, or that any of the Astros’ big three did in 2005. Speaking very roughly, they forecast Sheets’ ERA as comparable to, say, Zambrano’s at his peak in 2003 and 2004. Chris Capuano and Dave Bush fill out the rotation admirably. Continuing the approximate comparison with the 2003 Cubs, projections make each of these two look something like 2003 Clement. And they see Jeff Suppan as less than his former self. Yet the Brewers also have three or four additional pitchers who could fill in for most anyone in the middle of the rotation without hurting the starters’ overall effectiveness. Even if Sheets, Capuano, and Bush do not come to strike quite the fear that Clemens, Oswalt, and Pettitte recently did, these three starters could lead the division’s next great rotation.

Yet some projections prefer the Cardinals’ starting rotation, at least at the top. Marcel puts Carpenter behind Clemens yet ahead of Zambrano, Oswalt, and Sheets in its ERA list. And none of the projections put him far behind Sheets. More importantly, three of four projections prefer Anthony Reyes to Capuano; two of the four like him better than Bush; one has him breathing down the necks of Carp and Sheets. Of the two that project Adam Wainwright as a starter, one gives him a lower ERA than both Capuano and Bush; the other has him right behind Bush. The Cardinals’ rotation is not as deep as the Brewers’: Kip Wells does not project to match Suppan; and the competitors for St. Louis’ fifth spot do not look quite so good as Milwaukee’s reserve corps. Nevertheless, some projections expect quite good things from the Cards’ 2007 rotation. Do Carp, Reyes, and Wainwright have a better chance than the top three Brewers’ starters to become the division’s next elite rotation?

The short, biased answer: I doubt it.

The long, superficially statistical answer: 2003 stands out in recent NL Central history as the one season this millennium in which the Cardinals did not finish first in their division, and the one year that the Cubs did. That season the Cubs improved on a miserable 67-95 record in the previous year to take 88 wins, three better than St. Louis and just one better than the Astros. In other words, they did almost exactly what baseball forecasters and all of those diehard fans upstate have been promising that the Cubs will do since the Soriano signing. They’ve done it before. Can they do it again?

Rather than decide whether an offense featuring Lee, Ramirez, Soriano, and Barrett can match one including Sosa, Patterson, a younger Ramirez, and Alou (I suspect that it can), this post considers pitching and, in particular, starting pitching. For the Cubs’ starters must deserve much of the credit for the team’s break-up of the Cards’ otherwise complete dominance over the division in the 21st century. When people invoke Mark Prior and Kerry Wood in respectful tones, intimating that they could return to form any year now, they’re hinting at 2003 as the year of model form. Prior posted an amazing 2.43 ERA, 1.10 WHIP, and 5.10 WPA. Wood contributed a 3.20 ERA, 1.19 WHIP, and 4.77 WPA. Zambrano put up a 3.11 ERA, 1.32 WHIP, and 3.25 WPA. And, what’s perhaps more, the fourth-best starting performance went to Matt Clement, with a 4.11 ERA, 1.23 WHIP, and 1.44 WPA. Moreover, each pitched over 200 innings. If it took this sort of durable, consistently fine rotation for the Cubs to edge past the Astros and Cards and to reach 88 wins, do they have what it takes to do it again?

Zambrano surely provides the muscle of the Cubs’ rotation. And the four major, or at least free, projection systems (Bill James, Marcel, CHONE, and ZiPS) predict that he won’t lose much on his 2003 numbers. But Zambrano ended up the third best Cubs starter in 2003. And, after three years of injuries, neither Prior nor Wood can be expected to outmatch him like they did in 2003. Indeed, the projection systems forecast between 99 and 132 innings of 3.73-4.55 ERA ball for Prior: a full run or two higher than his 2003 performance at nearly half the playing time. And these systems expect Wood to log between just 52 and 101 innings, no doubt as a reliever, and to earn an average of between 3.81 and 4.36 runs.

What Cubs can pick up the slack? Despite the big money that the northsiders threw at a couple of starters this offseason, the young Rich Hill may be their best bet to shoulder some of the burden. Barring Marcel’s aberrant forecast of 4.46 ERA in 105 innings, Hill could contribute between 165 and 201 innings of 3.40 and 3.65 ERA starts. That would beat Matt Clement’s 2003. So the Cubs have the three and four spots in their 2003 rotation covered.

But that leaves virtually no one to make up for the persistent loss of the 2003 versions of Prior and Wood. Given the salary that he commanded, Ted Lilly will surely get a chance to fill in the gap. Yet the projections have him at an ERA of between 3.99 and 4.75 over 163-189 innings. That kind of pitching may replace the Cubs’ fourth or fifth starter in 2003. And it would come as a welcome contribution from a fifth starter in most any year. But you only get a fifth starter if you have four more promising pitchers. And, compared to the 2003 Cubs and judging by the projections, the 2007 Cubs have only two pitchers better than Lilly so far.

Which finally leads to Jason Marquis. If you’re like me, news of the Soriano deal struck fear, and word of Marquis’ move north came as the best imaginable news of the offseason. The projections generously promise a dramatic improvement from Marquis’ deplorable 2006 season with the Cardinals—at some 177-200 innings with a 4.78-5.13 ERA. (Note sarcastic tone.) Even if the projections are right, and somehow Larry Rothschild can outcoach both Leo Mazzone and Dave Duncan, Marquis is looking at numbers considerably worse than those of the Cubs’ fourth starter in 2003.

Who’s left? Sean Marshall of Richmond, Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University? The projections have him at just 115-128 innings at a 4.70-5.34 ERA. Angel Guzman? Projections say 61-123 innings at 4.13-5.45 ERA. Wade Miller? Projected at a reliever’s 43-87 innings, he forecasts an ERA of between 3.98 and 4.97.

The 2007 Cubs, in other words, have the starting pitching of the bottom of the rotation of the 2003 Cubs. Will that be enough to outperform rotations headed by Chris Carpenter, Roy Oswalt, Ben Sheets, and Bronson Arroyo? Will it be enough to keep the ball in Wrigley? Would you take Rich Hill over Anthony Reyes or Adam Wainwright (or Lee and Ramirez over Pujols and Rolen)? Will an offense featuring Soriano and a healthy Lee counteract the inevitable downturn in the Cubs’ pitching since the team’s twenty-first-century peak in 2003? I doubt it.